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PEERING INTO THE CORPORATE SOUL: HOBBYLOBBY
STORES, INC. V. SEBELIUS AND How FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS EXERCISE RELIGION
ABSTRACT
Amidst the storm of legal challenges to the Affordable Care Act and
its contraceptive mandate, religious business owners have unearthed an
entirely novel question of constitutional law: are for-profit corporations
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause? The answer to this contentious question raises issues involving
several fundamental areas of law, such as of statutory interpretation, cor-
porate structure and governance, and First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals are split over how to answer it, and recent-
ly the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve it. In Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit held that for-profit corporations
are entitled to free exercise rights. Its opinion articulates the one of the
most detailed and thorough analyses on this issue, which will likely play
a significant role in the Supreme Court's decision.
This Comment argues that he majority opinion in Hobby Lobby cor-
rectly held that for-profit corporations are capable of exercising religion
and are entitled to free exercise rights. However, the Comment contends
that the majority failed to adequately distinguish between the religious
exercise of the corporation and its constituents, and it proposes a test to
assist courts in identifying a corporation's religious beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) l and
contraceptive mandate2 promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has prompted a flurry of challenges and litiga-
tion from both religious and nonreligious entities alike.3 These challeng-
ers allege that the contraceptive mandate forces them to violate their sin-
cerely held religious belief that life begins at conception.4 They believe
that providing contraceptives that act as abortifacients, such as Plan B
and Ella, is a sin.5 After HHS adopted the contraceptive mandate, it es-
tablished several exemptions for "religious employers" but did not ex-
6tend an exemption to for-profit corporations.
As a result, the ACA and contraceptive mandate have unearthed an
entirely novel question in constitutional law: whether for-profit corpora-
tions and entities can exercise religion and thus receive the protection of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise
Clause.7 Not only is this issue novel, but the circuits are currently split
regarding how to resolve it.
8
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius9 is the Tenth Circuit's inter-
pretation of this issue and is currently one of the most thorough analyses
supporting the claim that for-profit corporations are: (1) capable of exer-
cising religion and (2) entitled to protection under RFRA and the Free
Exercise Clause.10 Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit delivered an opinion
1. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
2. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(l)(iv)(A) (2013).
3. During the publication of this Comment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and deliv-
ered an opinion on June 30, 2014. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
However, the information in this Comment focuses on the Tenth Circuit opinion and is current as of
February 24, 2014.
4. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
5. See, e.g., id.
6. Id. at 1123-24.
7. See, e.g., id. at 1120-21.
8. See Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and
the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA 's Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
1301, 1332 (2013).
9. 723 F.3d 1114(1Oth Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
10. Id. at 1]29.
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in Hobby Lobby that provides an in-depth analysis of the proper statutory
interpretation of RFRA, the constitutional free exercise precedent, and
the basic law of corporations."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in November 201312 and will
likely release a decision in June 2014. Based on the Court's controversial
decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission3 in 2010,
which expanded corporations' First Amendment free speech rights, there
is a strong possibility that the Court will affirm the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion.'4
This Comment provides a detailed analysis of Hobby Lobby and as-
sociated decisions, and ultimately concludes that the majority opinion in
Hobby Lobby correctly decided that for-profit corporations are entitled to
free exercise rights. However, it asserts that the majority opinion failed
to adequately distinguish between the religious beliefs of the corporation
and the beliefs of its constituents. In order for the corporation to receive
free exercise protection and for courts to uphold the fundamentals of
corporate law, it is imperative that courts identify which religious beliefs
and actions belong to the corporation and which beliefs belong to the
individuals who own and operate them. Finally, this Comment proposes
a test, based on the basic tenets of corporate law, for identifying a corpo-
ration's religious beliefs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Free Exercise Clause, Smith, and RFRA
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'15 The Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects religious beliefs and the exercise thereof and prohibits the govern-
ment from regulating or coercing action contrary to those beliefs. 16 This
protection extends to individuals 7 as well as organizations, corporations,
and associations that exercise religion.'
8
11. See generally id. at 1129-46.
12. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
13. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
14. However, the Supreme Court also granted certiorari to hear Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.
2013), a Third Circuit case, and consolidated the appeals. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). In Conestoga, the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the government.
724 F.3d at 417. Consequently, it remains unclear how the Court will resolve this issue.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 443 (2013).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) (addressing whether payment of
Social Security tax for employees substantially burdens an individual Amish employer's religious
beliefs).
18. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(2006) (affirming claim brought by a religious entity on its own behalt).
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Prior to 1990 and the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith,'9 the Court reviewed free exercise claims with strict scru-
tiny: if the plaintiff proved that the government law or regulation sub-
stantially burdened its sincere religious belief, the burden shifted to the
government to demonstrate a compelling state interest for the law.
20
However, Smith overruled the "compelling interest" test and held that "a
valid and neutral law of general applicability" is sufficiently constitu-
tional, even if it burdens a sincere religious belief.
2z
In response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted RFRA in
1993.22 RFRA restored the compelling interest test, stating:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of re-
ligion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
... [unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden to the per-
son-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govemmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
23
Thus, if a plaintiff proves that the government substantially bur-
dened the exercise of a person's sincere religious belief, RFRA shifts the
burden of proof to the government to establish that its action furthers a
compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. Signifi-
cantly, RFRA does not define the word "person.24
B. For-Profit Corporations and First Amendment Jurisprudence
The enactment of the ACA and the HHS contraceptive mandate
prompted the circuit courts of appeals to address a novel issue: whether
for-profit corporations have First Amendment free exercise rights.25 Alt-
hough the Supreme Court had not addressed this issue until it granted
26certiorari in this case, it has extended First Amendment free speech
rights to for-profit corporations in the past.
One of the foundational cases establishing corporate free speech
rights is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.2 7 The corporations in
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
20. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (finding that RFRA's enactment responded to the Smith
decision and intended "to restore the compelling interest test" in Sherbert); see also Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (2012).
24. Id. § 2000bb-2.
25. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (Sotomayor, Circuit
Justice 2012) ("This Court has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims
brought by closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders alleging that the
mandatory provision of certain employee benefits ubstantially burdens their exercise of religion.").
26. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
27. 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
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Bellotti wanted to publish their opposition to a proposed amendment to
the state constitution imposing a heightened personal income tax.28 How-
ever, a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibited corporations from mak-
ing expenditures to influence a vote that did not materially affect the
corporation's business.29 The corporations challenged the statute, arguing
that it impermissibly infringed upon their free speech rights.30 The Su-
preme Court held that the Massachusetts criminal statute was unconstitu-
tional.3' The majority ruled:
The court below framed the principal question in this case as
whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment
rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Con-
stitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seek-
ing their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves sig-
nificant societal interests. The proper question therefore is not wheth-
er corporations "have" First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the ques-
tion must be whether [the challenged statute] abridges expression that
the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.
32
Because the purpose of the Free Speech Clause is not dependent on the
identity of the speaker, the Court held that a restriction on speech based
solely on the speaker's corporate identity was unconstitutional.33
The Court acknowledged that the rights and liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution are not automatically guaranteed to corporations.34 To
determine whether a particular constitutional guarantee applies to corpo-
rations, the Court created the "purely personal" test.35 The Court first
articulated this test in a footnote in Bellotti, stating that "[c]ertain 'purely
personal' guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations .... Whether or
not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corpo-
rations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose
of the particular constitutional provision."36 In Bellotti, the Court held
that corporations are entitled to free speech rights because the purpose of
those rights is to afford the general "public access to discussion, debate,
and the dissemination of information and ideas," as well as to encourage
individual free speech.37 Therefore, the identity of the speaker is irrele-
28. Id. at 769.
29. Id. at 767-68.
30. Id. at 770.
31. Id. at 776.
32. Id. at 775-76.
33. Id. at 777-78, 784-85.
34. Id. at 778 (stating that "corporations 'cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees' (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925))).
35. See id at 778 n.14.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 783.
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vant to the purpose of free speech rights; in other words, the rights are
not purely personal.
In 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed corporate free speech rights
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.38 Citizens United
centered on campaign and political expenditures.39 The Citizens United
court examined the reasoning in prior precedent, which held that because
a corporate entity is not a natural person and has been granted "special
advantages-such as limited liability [and] perpetual life," it has there-
fore given up its First Amendment rights.40 However, relying on Bellotti,
the Citizens United Court "rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations hould be treated differently under the
First Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural per-
sons."'4 1 The Court's decision in Citizens United played a significant role
in the Hobby Lobby majority decision, as it formed the Tenth Circuit's
basis for recognizing corporate free exercise rights under the First
Amendment.4 2 Like the Citizens United Court, the Hobby Lobby court
rejected the government's argument that by using the corporate form, the
corporate plaintiffs gave up First Amendment free exercise rights.43
C. Circuit Court Treatment of For-Profit Corporations' RFRA Challeng-
es
Six circuit courts of appeals have considered for-profit corpora-
tions' RFRA challenges to the ACA contraceptive mandate, and so far
the circuits are split.44 The Third and Sixth Circuits have affirmed the
trial courts' decisions to deny the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
injunction, holding that the corporate and individual plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.45 However, the Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits reversed the district courts' denials and found
that the corporate plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on
38. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010).
39. See id at 318-20.
40. Id. at 350-51 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990)).
41. Id. at 343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
42. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Because
Hobby Lobby and Mardel express themselves for religious purposes, the First Amendment logic of
Citizens United, where the Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit
corporations to express themselves for political purposes, applies as well. We see no reason the
Supreme Court would recognize constitutional protection for a corporation's political expression but
not its religious expression." (citation omitted)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
43. Id. at 1135.
44. See generally Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723
F.3d at 1120-21; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Autocam Corp. v.
Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733
F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025,
at *1, *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).
45. See, e.g., Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 388-89; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625-26, 628.
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the merits.46 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that the corporate plaintiff
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its RFRA and free exer-
cise claims.47 However, the D.C. Circuit granted the injunction on the
grounds that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the indi-
vidual plaintiffs' religious beliefs.48 Finally, the Eighth Circuit granted
the injunction pending appeal without discussion.49
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of United States
Department of Health & Human Services50 reached the opposite conclu-
sion of Hobby Lobby. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Con-
estoga case and consolidated the appeal with Hobby Lobby.5 Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. (Conestoga) is a closely held corporation that
manufactures wood cabinets and employs 950 employees.52 The Hahn
family owns all "of the voting shares of Conestoga.' '53 "The Hahns prac-
tice the Mennonite religion" and believe that the "taking of life which
includes anything that terminates a fertilized embryo is intrinsic evil and
a sin against God .... ',' The plaintiffs offered two theories on the cor-
poration's entitlement to free exercise rights: (1) directly, based on Citi-
zens United or (2) under a "pass through" theory, where the sharehold-
ers' beliefs pass through to the corporation.55 The plaintiffs' pass through
theory is based on the Ninth Circuit's decisions in EEOC v. Townley
Engineering & Manufacturing Co.
56 and Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
57
which held "that for-profit corporations can assert the free exercise
claims of their owners.
58
The Conestoga court rejected both theories.59 It determined that for-
profit corporations are not entitled to free exercise protection because the
right to free exercise of religion is a purely personal right and Free Exer-
cise Clause jurisprudence has never recognized such a right for for-profit
corporations.60 The court distinguished the case from Citizens United.61 It
held that Citizens United was supported by a long line of case law, which
affirmed that the right to free speech was not a purely personal right.
62
46. See, e.g.,Korte, 735 F.3dat682, 687;Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3dat 1121, 1147.
47. See generally Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215, 1224.
48. Id. at 1216, 1224.
49. Annex Med., 2013 WL 1276025, at *3; O'Brien v. U.S. Health & Human Servs., No. 12-
3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26633, at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
50. 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
51. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 134
S. Ct. 678 (2013).
52. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 381-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 387.
56. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
57. 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
58. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 386-87.
59. Id. at 387-88.
60. Id. at 384-85.
61. Id. at 384-86.
62. Id. at 383-84.
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The court also pointed out that the Free Speech Clause and the Free Ex-
ercise Clause have always been interpreted independently.63 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' pass through theory, holding that the Town-
ley and Stormans decisions disregarded "the very nature of the corporate
form," which is a "distinct legal entity ... from those of the natural indi-
viduals who" incorporated it. 64 The court could not find a reason to ig-
nore that distinction.65 Having rejected both the direct and pass through
theories, the Conestoga court held that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA and free exer-
cise claims.
66
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Conestoga court's reasoning in Auto-
cam Corp. v. Sebelius67 and Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius.68 Autocam
Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC (collectively Autocam) are
closely held for-profit corporations owned by the Kennedys, a Roman
Catholic family.69 Autocam manufactures products "for the automotive
and medical industries. '70 Eden Foods, Inc. (Eden) is a natural foods
corporation owned and operated by Michal Potter, also a Roman Catho-
lic. 71 Both the individual family-owners and their corporations chal-
72lenged the ACA contraceptive mandate. In both cases, the Sixth Circuit
held that the individual shareholder plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a
RFRA claim due to the corporation's distinct legal identity.73 The court
further held that the corporate plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits because, according to the court's statutory inter-
pretation of RFRA, for-profit corporations are not persons under
RFRA . 4
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, held that for-profit corpora-
tions are persons under RFRA in the consolidated cases Korte v. Sebe-
Iius,75 and Grote v. Sebelius.76 K & L Contractors, a construction compa-
ny owned by the Korte family, and Grote Industries, a vehicle safety
manufacturing company owned by the Grote family, are closely held
corporations.77 Both families are Catholic and object to providing aborti-
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id. at 389.
67. 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013).
68. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2013); Autocam, 730 F.3d at
628.
69. Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620.
70. Id.
71. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 629.
72. Id. at 630; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620.
73. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 632-33; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 622-23.
74. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 632; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 628.
75. 735 F.3d 654, 659, 682 (7th Cir. 2013).
76. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting injunction pending appeal
and consolidating appeal with Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013)).
77. Korte, 735 F.3d at 662-63.
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facient contraceptives based on their Catholic beliefs.78 The Seventh Cir-
cuit held, "The government's proposed exclusion of secular, for-profit
corporations finds no support in the text or relevant context of RFRA or
any related statute.79
Finally, in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Ser-
vices, the D.C. Circuit added yet another potential solution to the for-
profit corporation RFRA conundrum.81 The court held that the secular,
for-profit corporate plaintiffs, Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics
(collectively Freshway), did not have a free exercise right because the
"'nature, history, and purpose' of the Free Exercise Clause ... militat[es]
against the discernment of such a right., 82 The court also refused to adopt
the Ninth Circuit pass through theory, although it found the argument
"logically and structurally appealing.,83 Yet, it did decide that the Gilardi
brothers who own Freshway demonstrated a likelihood of success on
their RFRA claim, and stated:
If the companies have no claim to enforce-and as nonreligious cor-
porations, they cannot engage in religious exercise-we are left with
the obvious conclusion: the right belongs to the Gilardis, existing in-
dependently of any right of the Freshway companies. Thus, the Gi-
lardis' injury-which arises therefrom-is "separate and distinct,"
providing us with an exception to the shareholder-standing rule.
84
Freshway is the entity that is required to comply with the contraceptive
mandate, not the Gilardis.85 Therefore the direct injury, either financial or
moral, is to the corporation. 86 It is unclear from the court's analysis how
it makes the leap from an injury to Freshway to an injury to the Gilardis
without addressing that Freshway and Gilardi are distinct legal entities.
II. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. V. SEBELIUS
A. Facts and Procedural History
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby) is a retail arts and crafts
chain incorporated under Oklahoma law.87 Hobby Lobby is a closely
held S-corporation owned and operated by David and Barbara Green and
their three children.88 The Green family also owns and operates Mardel,
78. Id. at 662-64.
79. Id. at 679.
80. 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
81. See id at 1212-16.
82. Id. at 1214.
83. Id. at 1214-15.
84. Id. at 1216.
85. See id. at 1210-11.
86. See id.
87. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Verified Complaint at 7, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), (No. CIV-12-1000-HE).
88. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122.
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Inc., a Christian bookstore chain.89 Hobby Lobby has over 500 stores
nationwide with about 13,000 full-time employees; Mardel has 35 stores
nationwide with around 400 employees.
9
0
Both Hobby Lobby and Mardel are operated according to express
Christian principles.9' Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose reads,
"[H]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles.,92 Hobby Lobby and Mardel are both
closed on Sundays, and "Hobby Lobby buys hundreds of full-page
newspaper ads inviting people to 'know Jesus as Lord and Savior."'
93
Mardel only sells Christian books and materials.94 Hobby Lobby and
Mardel are operated through a management trust, which requires each
trustee to sign an agreement that "requires them to affirm the Green
family statement of faith. 95 A principal tenet of the Green's faith is the
belief that life begins at conception and that "it is immoral ... to facili-
tate any act that causes the death of a human embryo."96 Hobby Lobby
and Mardel's current employment-based group health plan does not cov-
er certain contraceptives, such as Plan B and Ella, which prevent a ferti-
lized zygote from implanting in the uterine wall.
97
One of the provisions of the ACA requires employment-based
group health plans to provide preventative health services for women.
98
HHS adopted the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine to require
such health plans to include twenty FDA-approved contraceptives.99 This
requirement has come to be known as the contraceptive-coverage re-
quirement or the contraceptive mandate.1° Four of these methods "can
function by preventing the implantation of a fertilized egg."' 
0 1
HHS has established exceptions to this contraceptive mandate for
"religious employers," certain nonprofit organizations, "grandfathered"
plans, and "businesses with fewer than fifty employees."' 0 2 According to
HHS regulations, an organization is a religious employer if it satisfies all









97. Id. at 1124-25.
98. Id. at 1122 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2012)).
99. Id. at 1123.
100. See id. at 1123-24.
101. Id. at 1123; see also id. at 1123 n.3 ("There is an ongoing medical debate as to whether
some of the contraceptive methods relevant to this case act by preventing implantation or fertiliza-
tion." (emphasis omitted)).
102. Id. at 1123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (identifying the entities exempt from the
contraceptive mandate).
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(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organiza-
tion.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the reli-
gious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in sec-
tion 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code .... 103
If an organization's employment-based group health plan does not fall
under one of the exemptions and fails to comply with the contraceptive
mandate, the organization will be taxed "$100 for each day in the non-
compliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure
relates.' ' I ra
Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not qualify for any of the current HHS
exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. As for-profit organizations,
they cannot qualify as religious employers or for the other nonprofit-
based exemptions.10 5 They also do not "qualify for the 'grandfathered'
status exemption because they elected not to maintain grandfathered sta-
tus" before the contraceptive mandate was proposed.10 6 Therefore, if the
term "individual" in the regulation refers to each individual covered by a
health plan, Hobby Lobby and Mardel's failure to provide the required
contraceptive coverage for its 13,000 full-time employees would result in
a $1.3 million dollar fine per day.'
0 7
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and the Greens filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Western Oklahoma and moved for a preliminary
injunction, arguing that the HHS contraceptive mandate violated the Free
Exercise Clause and RFRA.1°8 The district court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction, holding that secular, for-profit corporations do
not have constitutional free exercise rights'0 9 and are not persons under
RFRA. 10 The plaintiffs then filed an application to the Tenth Circuit for
an injunction pending appellate review, which the court denied."' Justice
Sotomayor, sitting as the Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit, also de-
103. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013).
104. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012).
105. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d atl 124.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1125.
108. Id.
109. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287-88 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
110. Id. at 1291-92.
111. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (10th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 641 (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice 2012).
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nied the plaintiffs' application to the United States Supreme Court for an
injunction pending appellate review because Hobby Lobby's claims did
not meet the "indisputably clear" standard required for a Justice to grant
the injunction.' Justice Sotomayor noted that "[t]his Court has not pre-
viously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by
closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders"
and left the door open for a petition for certiorari following a final judg-
ment. '13
Following Justice Sotomayor's denial of an injunction pending ap-
peal, the Tenth Circuit heard the Hobby Lobby appeal en banc.14 The
resulting decision covered a variety of complex issues. In addition to the
majority opinion, there were three concurring opinions, one dissenting
opinion, and one opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part."
5
This Comment addresses only how for-profit corporations exercise reli-
gion and whether the First Amendment, RFRA, or both protect such ex-
ercise. The remaining issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
B. Tymkovich Majority Opinion: The Case for Corporate Religious Ex-
ercise
Judge Tymkovich, writing for the majority, focused on the merits of
Hobby Lobby and Mardel's RFRA claim.116 The primary issue was
whether for-profit entities constituted persons capable of exercising reli-
gion.' 7 The government argued that secular, for-profit entities are not
persons entitled to RFRA protection because the RFRA term person car-
ries forward a for-profit/nonprofit distinction from similar statutes, such
as civil rights statutes and labor laws, and that this distinction is "rooted
in the Free Exercise Clause."" 8 Hobby Lobby countered that the plain
language of the statute supports the inclusion of corporate entities.,'9 It
also asserted that the Supreme Court has already applied RFRA to some
corporate entities, not just to individuals.' 
20
The majority began by addressing the statutory interpretation of the
word person in RFRA. Because RFRA does not specifically define the
112. Hobby Lobby, 133 S. Ct. at 642-43 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 542 U.S.
1305, 1306 (2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113. Id. at 643.
114. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1120 n. * (10th Cir.
2013) (noting that Judge Jerome A. Holmes recused himself), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
115. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 1128.
118. Id. at 1128-29.
119. Reply Brief for Appellants, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013) (No.12-6294), 2013 WL 1399593, at *18.
120. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129.
121. Id
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term, Judge Tymkovich began by looking at the Dictionary Act.122 The
Dictionary Act states, "[U]nless the context indicates otherwise . . . the
word[] 'person' . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,...
as well as individuals."'' 23 The majority asserted that, because the plain
language of the statute includes corporations, it "could end the matter
[t]here," especially because neither RFRA nor the Dictionary Act ex-
presses a for-profit/nonprofit distinction.
24
Although the majority asserted that it could end the discussion at the
Dictionary Act and plain meaning of the statute, it continued to examine
whether RFRA's legislative context, such as its legislative history and
other statutes providing religious exemptions, indicated a different inter-
pretation of the word person.125 It decided that it did not.126 The govern-
ment pointed to similar statutes that only provide religious exemptions to
nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, and religious employ-
ers. 27 The government argued that these statutes' exemptions indicate
Congress's intent to limit religious exemptions to nonprofit, religious
entities rather than for-profit entities, and that Congress "carried for-
ward" this interpretation into the definition of person in RFRA.12' The
court refused to accept the government's argument, instead finding that
the religious exemptions in similar statutes "show that Congress knows
how to craft a corporate religious exemption, but chose not to do so in
RFRA. ' ' 129 As a result, the court concluded that "when the exemptions
are not present, it is not that they are 'carried forward' but rather that
they do not apply."' 30
The court also rejected the government's argument that the case law
from the time RFRA was drafted indicated that Congress intended to
incorporate a for-profit/nonprofit distinction into the term person.131 The
government cited Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,132 a Title VII case in which a non-
profit run by the Mormon Church fired employees who did not adhere to
religious behavioral standards.33 In Amos, the government argued that
allowing religious discrimination for for-profit, nonreligious jobs would
violate the Establishment Clause.'34 Thus, according to the government,
there is a for-profit/nonprofit distinction in free exercise jurisprudence
122. Id.
123. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
124. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at'l 129.
125. Id. at 1129-30.
126. Id. at 1130.
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1131.
132. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
133. SeeHobbyLobby, 723 F.3d at 1131.
134. Id. (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 331).
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that denies protection to for-profit entities.1 35 However, the Amos court
found that the activities in question were not for-profit; therefore, the
issue of whether for-profit entities could receive the protections of the
Free Exercise Clause was still an open question.'36 Because the Supreme
Court had not decided this issue when Congress drafted RFRA, the court
reasoned that a for-profit/nonprofit distinction could not be implied in
Congress's use of person in RFRA based on case law alone.1 37 The court
also found that the cases cited by the government indicated only that for-
profit/nonprofit status is one relevant factor in determining whether
RFRA applies but did not indicate that it was dispositive.138 Furthermore,
these cases were decided after RFRA was enacted; therefore, their for-
profit/nonprofit distinctions could not have influenced Congress's intent
in drafting RFRA139
Having disposed with the statutory issue, Judge Tymkovich next
addressed the First Amendment issue.'40 The majority began by noting
that groups, as well as individuals, have rights under the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause.141 In support of this position, the majority
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees,142 which states: "An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and
to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vig-
orously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative free-
dom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaran-
teed.'' 143 Thus, First Amendment protection extends not only to individu-
als; it also extends to the organizations or corporations they participate in
to exercise their First Amendment rights.144 The court also cited to Citi-
zens United, which extended First Amendment protection to corpora-
tions. 45 Because the Supreme Court has extended Free Exercise Clause
and First Amendment protection to associations and nonprofit corpora-
tions, "the Free Exercise Clause is not a "'purely personal" guarantee[]
... unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the "his-
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 337); Amos, 483 U.S. 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1132.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1133.
141. Id.
142. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
143. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis omitted) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). The
United States Jaycees is a nonprofit membership corporation whose purpose is to promote civic
organizations for young men. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13.
144. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("(W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.").
145. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43
(2010)).
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toric function" of the particular [constitutional] guarantee has been lim-
ited to the protection of individuals."1
46
Having established that free exercise jurisprudence extends free ex-
ercise rights to incorporated entities, the majority next addressed whether
a corporation's for-profit/nonprofit status affects its free exercise
rights.147 Judge Tymkovich noted that the Free Exercise Clause protects
more than religious beliefs; it also protects religiously motivated con-
duct, including religious expression. 148 Such religious conduct can be
exercised by individuals and corporations alike, regardless of nonprofit
status.149 Although Hobby Lobby and Mardel are for-profit corporations,
according to the majority they express themselves religiously by publish-
ing hundreds of proselytizing ads. 50 The court concluded that:
Because Hobby Lobby and Mardel express themselves for religious
purposes, the First Amendment logic of Citizens United, where the
Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit
corporations to express themselves for political purposes, applies as
well. We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize constitu-
tional protection for a corporation's political expression but not its re-
ligious expression.
151
Judge Tymkovich argued that the exercise of religion and the pur-
suit of profit are not mutually exclusive.152 A person, such as a kosher
butcher, may choose to incorporate to take advantage of limited liability
protections or tax rates while still engaging in business practices in-
formed by her religion.1
5 3
The court was also troubled by the notion of tying Free Exercise
rights to a congressional definition of "nonprofit.'', 54 "What if," the ma-
jority hypothesized, "Congress eliminates the for-profit/non-profit dis-
tinction in tax law? Do for-profit corporations then gain Free Exercise
rights? Or do non-profits lose Free Exercise rights?"' 5 As a result, the
majority rejected "such a bright-line rule" that extended free exercise
rights only to religious organizations. M
Judge Tymkovich acknowledged that the holding of this case could
potentially "raise difficult questions of how to determine the corpora-
146. Id. at 1133-34 (alterations in original) (omission in original) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)).
147. Id. at 1134.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1135.





156. Id. at 1136.
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tion's sincerity of belief."'' 57 However, he declined to address those ques-
tions because the sincerity of Hobby Lobby's, Mardel's, and the Green's
beliefs were not in dispute.58 The Tenth Circuit held that the corpora-
tion's explicitly Christian mission, proselytizing activity, and adherence
to Christian standards provided sufficient evidence that Hobby Lobby's
and Mardel's religious beliefs were sincere, and therefore qualify for
RFRA protection.59 Thus, the majority explicitly avoided deciding what
factors are necessary to determine the sincerity of a corporation's reli-
gious beliefs.
160
C. Hartz Concurrence: An Examination of a Corporate Right to Exercise
Religion'
61
Judge Hartz agreed with Judge Tymkovich that the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA protect for-profit corporations.162 He outlined three
characteristics of corporations that could weigh against corporations hav-
ing free exercise rights: "(1) [the corporation] is for profit, (2) it has
adopted a corporate form, and (3) it is a group activity.'' 63 He then as-
serted that none of these features disqualify corporations from First
Amendment protection and free exercise rights.'
64
The first feature, profit-seeking, fails to disqualify for-profit corpo-
rations because the Supreme Court previously extended free exercise
protection to individual profit-seekers in Braunfeld v. Brown165 and Unit-
ed States v. Lee.166 Even though profit-seeking may not be a religious
exercise, those who seek profits may still be required by their religious
convictions to participate in, or to refrain from, certain activities when
operating their businesses.67 Judge Hartz stated, "The Constitution does
not require compartmentalization of the psyche, saying that one's reli-
gious persona can participate only in nonprofit activities.", 
68
The second feature, use of the corporate form, also fails to disquali-
fy for-profit corporations from free exercise protection. While the gov-
ernment may require special obligations from individuals who use the
corporate form or place limitations on a corporation's constitutional
157. See id. at H136-37.
158. Id. at 1137.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Because the scope of this Comment is limited to the issue of whether and how a for-profit
corporation can exercise religion, I will only address the concurring opinions that discuss this issue.
Therefore, the concurring opinions of Judge Gorsuch and Judge Bacharach are not discussed in this
Comment.
162. Id. at 1147 (Hartz, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
166. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1148 (Hartz, J.,
concurring) (citing Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601; Lee, 455 U.S. at 254).
167. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1148 (Hartz, J., concurring).
168. Id.
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rights, Judge Hartz argued that these obligations and limitations that the
government imposes "must relate to use of the corporate form."' 69 The
use of the corporate form to limit personal financial liability has no con-
nection to a corporation's decision to form its business practices around
religious beliefs.170 Furthermore, "First Amendment jurisprudence is
based on the substance of the constitutional protections, not matters of
form."'17 1 Thus, the use of the corporate form should not be dispositive of
a corporation's claim for First Amendment protection.
Judge Hartz addressed the third feature of the corporate form, the
"group-activity feature," and similarly concluded that this feature does
not disqualify a corporation from free exercise protection.172 One could
argue that "group-activity" diminishes the constitutional right to free
exercise because a group itself cannot "believe" and the group may not
reflect each constituent's beliefs.173 Judge Hartz responded by asserting
that although organizations do not "have souls[,] . . . it does not follow
that people must sacrifice their souls to engage in group activities
through an organization."'74 He further asserts that the rights of an organ-
ization are distinct from rights of group members, because "one who acts
through a group loses a measure of personal autonomy .... The group
may say something that is anathema to one of its members or do some-
thing contrary to the religious faith of a member."'' 75 According to Judge
Hartz, the religious speech or conduct only needs to represent an official
position of the corporation to gain free exercise protections.76 He reiter-
ated his claim that "[o]ne who wants to have a prosperous business, but a
business that still does nothing contrary to one's faith, can reasonably
decide that the best way to accomplish this is to join with like-minded
persons, perhaps as partners, perhaps as fellow shareholders."'
177
He dismissed the argument that for-profits are not entitled to free
exercise protection because there is no precedent for the principle that
for-profit corporations are persons under RFRA.1 78 He pointed out that
the Supreme Court has never ruled one way or the other on the issue;
therefore, there is no precedent that for-profit corporations do not have
the right to the free exercise of religion.1
79
Judge Hartz finally addressed two of dissenting Chief Judge Bris-





173. See id. at 1148-49.
174. Id. at 1148.
175. Id. at 1149.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1150.
179. Id.
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advantage of ... government rule[s] or requirement[s]" based on the
"exercise of religion ' 80 and (2) the fear that granting free exercise rights
to for-profit corporations would "open[] the floodgates to RFRA litiga-
tion.' ' 81 As to the first concern, Judge Hartz argued that a corporate
plaintiff must prove that its religious belief is sincere in order to be pro-
tected by RFRA, and "sincerity questions with respect to corporations
should not be unmanageable."' 82 According to Judge Hartz, the court
could determine the sincerity of the corporation's belief through factors
such as (1) the consistency of the corporation's beliefs with its history
and (2) the recognition of who has authority to speak and act for the enti-
ty. 
183
Addressing the dissent's second concern about opening the RFRA
litigation floodgates, Judge Hartz countered, "[I]t makes no sense under
RFRA to refuse to grant a merited exemption just because others may
also seek it. How ironic if a burden on religious objectors can be justified
because 'too many' objectors find a law repugnant."'84 He concluded that
Congress rejected a similar argument expressed in Smith when it enacted
RFRA. 185
D. Briscoe Dissent: Lack of Evidence, Lack of Precedent, Lack of
Right
1 86
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent focused on three deficiencies.187 First,
she argued that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence regarding
how the corporate plaintiffs exercise religion.1 88 Second, she asserted that
the majority imposed the plaintiffs' burden of persuasion on the defend-
ants.189 Finally, she claimed that there is no precedent that supports the
plaintiffs' RFRA claims or "the new class of corporations effectively
recognized by the majority."'
' 90
180. Id. at 1165 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181. Id. at 1174.
182. Id. at 1150 (Hartz, J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1150-51 (citing Emp't Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 888 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized in Sossamon
v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011)).
186. Id. at 1163 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge Briscoe
agrees, along with every other judge, that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to the RFRA claims
in this appeal. Id. at 1164. She dissents from the majority's opinion that the plaintiffs have demon-
strated a substantial likelihood of success on its RFRA claim, and she would affirm the district
court's denial of injunctive relief. Id. at 1163-64.
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At the beginning of her opinion, Chief Judge Briscoe pointed out
that the evidentiary record on appeal was scant.19' The "plaintiffs pre-
sented no evidence of any kind" during the preliminary injunction hear-
ing, and at the time of the appeal the defendants had not even filed an
answer to the complaint.92 As a result, Chief Judge Briscoe asserted that
the "plaintiffs presented no evidence attempting to demonstrate whether
or how Hobby Lobby and Mardel hold religious beliefs, and whether or
how these corporate plaintiffs . . . exercise religion.", 93 Because the
plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden, the district court cor-
rectly denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. 94 Chief Judge
Briscoe was also concerned about how eager the majority was to reach
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims when the evidentiary record was so
deficient. 195
Chief Judge Briscoe next addressed the merits of the corporate
plaintiffs' RFRA claims, asserting that the majority made "a number of
critical mistakes" in concluding that the corporate plaintiffs were persons
within the meaning of RFRA.19 6 Chief Judge Briscoe noted that "Hobby
Lobby and Mardel are, in a nutshell, for-profit businesses focused on
selling merchandise to consumers" rather than "faith-based compan[ies]"
or organizations with "religious mission[s].' 9 7 Although Hobby Lobby's
statement of purpose reflects a commitment to Christian religious princi-
ples, Chief Judge Briscoe concluded that such a purpose does not alter
the companies' for-profit status or place them in a "unique class for pur-
poses of RFRA.''198 By labeling Hobby Lobby and Mardel "'faith-based
companies' and businesses with a 'religious mission,"' the dissent argued
that the majority had created an unprecedented "new legal category of
for-profit corporation[s] .
The dissent next criticized the majority's analysis of the definition
of person under RFRA, claiming that RFRA's legislative history does
not support a definition that includes for-profit entities.200 The legislative
history indicates that Congress enacted RFRA to restore the compelling
interest test for free exercise challenges, the test that the Supreme Court
overruled in Smith.20 1 However, Congress did not intend to expand the
202scope of free exercise rights. As a result, the Free Exercise Clause caselaw in existence at the time RFRA was passed serves as the relevant con-




195. Id. at 1164-65.
196. Id. at 1165.
197. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1122, 1128 (majority opinion)).
198. Id. at 1165-66.
199. Id. at 1166.
200. Id. at 1166-67.
201. Id. at 1167.
202. Id.
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text for interpreting the meaning of person in RFRA.203 Chief Judge
Briscoe asserted that the plaintiffs failed to provide pre-RFRA precedent
to support their claim that RFRA covers for-profit corporate entities
"[n]ot because they have overlooked precedent ... [b]ut rather because
none exists.,,204 Because the Supreme Court has never addressed whether
for-profit corporations have free exercise rights, Chief Judge Briscoe
concluded that the Supreme Court considers such rights as confined to
religious non-profits and individual practitioners.°5
Having dispensed with the majority's RFRA analysis, Chief Judge
Briscoe next turned to its Free Exercise Clause analysis.20 6 She first ar-
gued that there is no precedent to support the conclusion that for-profit
entities can exercise religion separate from the individuals who incorpo-
rate them.2 °7 A basic tenet of corporate law is that the corporation is a
new legal entity, distinctly separate from the natural individuals who
create it. 20 8 Chief Judge Briscoe claimed that the majority had impermis-
sibly conflated the religious beliefs of the Green family with the religious
beliefs of the corporations209 resulting in "a radical revision of First
Amendment law, as well as the law of corporations.'" 210 She pointed out
that the majority had failed to answer several key questions in its analy-
sis, such as "whether corporations can 'believe,"' how courts should de-
termine what a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs are, and how the
rights associated with such beliefs are distinct from the corporation's
constituents' rights.211 As a result, the majority had "opened the flood-
gates to RFRA litigation," and "entangle[d] the government in the im-
permissible business of determining whether for-profit corporations are
sufficiently 'religious' to be entitled to protection under RFRA.'2
E. Matheson Dissent
213
Judge Matheson, while agreeing with Chief Judge Briscoe that the
corporate plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing a likelihood of
success on their RFRA claim, declined to conclude that RFRA and Free
Exercise Clause cannot apply "to any for-profit corporation[s]. '1 4 He
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1167-68.
205. Id. at 1168.
206. Id. at HI70.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1171 (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)).
209. Id. at 1173-75.
210. Id. at 1172.
211. Id. at 1174.
212. Id. at 1174-75.
213. Id. at 1178 (Matheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Matheson
agrees with the majority that Hobby Lobby and Mardel have Article IlI standing. Id. at 1121 (majori-
ty opinion). He further concludes that the Greens have standing. Id. He also "reaches the merits of
the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Claim, concluding that it does not merit "preliminary injunctive relief."
Id.
214. Id. at 1179 (Matheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was reluctant to "attempt a final answer on such a novel and significant
question until [the Court had] to" and simply stated that "the plaintiffs
have not met their burden at this point.
' 215
According to Judge Matheson, "[t]he majority and the plaintiffs...
ignor[ed] the corporate form and imput[ed] the religious beliefs of the
Greens to the corporations."2 16 He acknowledged that courts may "'dis-
regard the corporate form' or 'pierce the corporate veil' under limited
circumstances even though corporations and their constituents are dis-
217tinct entities. However, courts only pierce the corporate veil "reluc-
tantly and cautiously,,218 and they "require evidence" to do so but "plain-
tiffs have presented none.,219 He made no judgment regarding the suc-
cess of such an argument in the future.22 °
III. PEERING INTO THE CORPORATE SOUL: How CORPORATIONS
EXERCISE RELIGION
A. For-Profit Corporations Should Not Be Per Se Excluded from RFRA
and Free Exercise Clause Protections
The Tenth Circuit's holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel demon-
strated a likelihood of success on their RFRA and Free Exercise Clause
claims was the correct result for two reasons. First, the question of
whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion has never been de-
cided by the Supreme Court; therefore, a lack of precedent directly sup-
porting free exercise protection of a for-profit corporation does not indi-
22cate that such rights do not extend to for-profits. 21 Second, the right to
free exercise of religion is not a purely personal constitutional right, and
222
therefore it extends to both corporate entities and natural persons.
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent in Hobby Lobby, as well as the major-
ity opinions in Conestoga nd Autocam, found the lack of precedent per-
suasive proof that for-profit corporations do not have free exercise
rights.223 However, the Supreme Court has specifically left open the issue
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1181-82.
217. Id. at 1182 (quoting Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998)).
218. Id. (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051
(10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
219. Id. at 1183.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1133-35 (majority opinion).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1168-69 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Djuring the
200-year span between the adoption of the First Amendment and RFRA's passage, the Supreme
Court consistently treated free exercise rights as confined to individuals and non-profit religious
organizations."); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013) ("While the Su-
preme Court has recognized the rights of sole proprietors under the Free Exercise Clause during this
period, it has never recognized similar rights on behalf of corporations pursuing secular ends for
profit."); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[W]e are not aware of any case preceding the commencement of
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of whether for-profit activity can constitute a protectable exercise of reli-
gion.224 An issue that the Court has left open is not the same as an issue
that has no precedent to support it.
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent specifically highlighted the dearth of
precedent "during the 200-year span between the adoption of the First
Amendment and RFRA's passage" supporting the concept that for-
profits can exercise religion. 22  However, there is a similar dearth of
precedent explicitly denying for-profit free exercise rights. Even though
the courts have not addressed the issues of for-profit religious activity,
corporations and other for-profit entities have historically pursued public,
social, or religious activities beyond profit-making.226 As early as the
development of Roman societates, organizations formed to share the
burden of guaranteeing taxes collected for public purposes, "bestowing
legal personality on the corporation has been understood to go hand-in-
hand with rendering corporations accountable for the fulfillment of social
purposes., 227 During the Vietnam War era, the corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) movement gained traction as reformers "sought to make the
corporation more responsible to other constituencies [besides sharehold-
ers]" and address broader social issues.228 Religion, as well as social is-
sues, has also factored in to for-profit activity. Investors who wish to
invest their money in accordance with their religion can invest in specifi-
cally faith-based mutual or hedge funds, such as LKCM Aquinas Funds
and Ava Maria Funds (Catholic), Amana Mutual Funds (Islamic), and
Guidestone Funds (Protestant), which invest in companies according to
religious principles.229 For example, these mutual funds may not invest in
"sin stocks," such as "alcohol, pornography[,] or gambling."230 These
mutual or hedge funds, as corporations, observe and apply religious prin-
litigation about the [m]andate[] in which a for-profit, secular corporation was itself found to have
free exercise rights."), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
224. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is ... conceivable that some for-
profit activities could have a religious character."); id at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[U]nder
the holding of the Court,... the question of the constitutionality of the [Title VII section] as applied
to for-profit activities of religious organizations remains open.").
225. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1168 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1144-45 (2012) ("Prior to the nineteenth
century... many corporations were charged with carrying out public-serving functions, but this was
not a requirement of business more generally. This public-service dimension seems not to have been
an express legal prerequisite to corporate formation but instead reflected in practice a shared belief
about the proper focus of corporate activity." (footnote omitted)).
227. MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 63
(Chip Pitts ed., 2009).
228. Jerome J. Shestack, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Changing Corporate World, in
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 97, 99
(Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005).
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ciples in deciding where to invest their client's funds.23 1 In doing so, they
arguably are exercising religion. According to Lake Lambert III in his
book, Spirituality, Inc., during the 1990s:
[The traditional] "firewall" between spirituality and business ... was
a barrier that was breaking down as both individuals and organiza-
tions undergo a spiritual awakening. Individuals are seeking to bring
their whole selves to the workplace, including their spirituality, and
businesses today are dependent upon the creativity that only "con-
sciousness" and spirituality can provide.
232
There has also been a particularly explicit effort among evangelical
Christians "to align business practices with Christian principles" and
create "Christian companies.,233 In 1991, seventy-three percent of com-
panies that were members of an organization called Fellowship of Com-
panies for Christ reported that they sought "to proselytize customers.234
Because proselytizing is a form of religious exercise, it follows that for-
profit corporations can, and to some extent do, exercise religion. The
majority in Hobby Lobby pointed out that Hobby Lobby and Mardel en-
gage in such proselytizing activity.
235
Because for-profit corporations can, at least to a certain extent, ex-
ercise religion, the next question is whether the Constitution extends free
exercise protection to for-profit corporations. In Conestoga, the Third
Circuit held that corporations, although entitled to some constitutional
rights, are not entitled to constitutional rights that are "purely personal"
based on the "historic function" of the right as described by the Supreme
Court in a footnote in Bellotti.236 The Conestoga court relied on the lack
of precedent as support for the proposition that the historic function of
the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle for-profit corporations to its
237protection. This argument misinterprets the reasoning of Bellotti, as
well as the history surrounding corporate constitutional rights.
While the Third Circuit focused only on the Bellotti footnote ex-
cluding corporations from the protection of purely personal rights, the
main text of the majority opinion in Bellotti illuminates the correct con-
text of corporate constitutional rights. The Bellotti Court reasoned, "The
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seek-
231. Id.
232. LAKE LAMBERT III, SPIRITUALITY, INC.: RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 2
(2009).
233. Id. at 54.
234. Id. at 54-55 (citing Nabil A. Ibrahim et al., Characteristics and Practices of "Christian-
Based" Companies, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 123, 128 (1991)).
235. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
236. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14
(1978)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
237. Id. at 384-85.
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ing their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves signifi-
cant societal interests .... If the speakers here were not corporations, no
one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
238
The appellee's argument in Bellotti seems to parallel the government's in
Hobby Lobby.239 The government in Hobby Lobby argued that free exer-
cise rights should only extend to explicitly religious entities, such as
churches or religious nonprofit organizations, just as the government in
Bellotti argued that full free speech rights should only extend to explicit-
240ly speech-related entities, such as the press. Yet the Bellotti Court re-
jected this argument. 24 It emphasized that although the press has a "spe-
cial and constitutionally recognized role," the press "does not have a
monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten."242 It
follows that, although churches and religious nonprofit organizations
have a special, constitutionally recognized role in free exercise jurispru-
dence, those entities do not have a monopoly on the exercise of religion
or the protection of the First Amendment.
Despite this parallel, one could distinguish Bellotti on the grounds
that, although a long line of case law demonstrates that the press does not
have a monopoly on corporate free speech, case law is silent on for-
profit, corporate religious exercise rights. One could argue that this lack
of precedent demonstrates that the rights do not exist. However, this ar-
gument has been discussed in detail and found to be insufficient.
243
Bellotti also raised the following concern:
If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to busi-
ness," it also may limit other corporations-religious, charitable, or
civic-to their respective "business" when addressing the public.
Such power in government to channel the expression of views is un-
acceptable under the First Amendment.
244
Drawing the parallel to the case of free exercise rights, allowing the leg-
islative or executive branch to limit free exercise rights only to natural
persons, churches, or religious nonprofit organizations also constitutes an
impermissible channeling of religious exercise.
238. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77.
239. Compare id. at 781-83 ("[A]pellee suggests that First Amendment rights generally have
been afforded only to corporations engaged in the communications business or through which indi-
viduals express themselves .... But the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amend-
ment or the ability to enlighten."), with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135-36 ("We are also troubled-
as we believe Congress would be-by the notion that Free Exercise rights turn on Congress's defini-
tion of 'non-profit.' What if Congress eliminates the for-profit/non-profit distinction in tax law? Do
for-profit corporations then gain Free Exercise rights? Or do non-profits lose Free Exercise rights?").
240. Compare Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781, with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1136.
241. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 781-84.
242. Id. at 781-82.
243. See supra pp. 21-22.
244. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785.
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In contrast to the Third Circuit's assertion that free exercise rights
are purely personal, Hobby Lobby pointed out that the Supreme Court
has recognized the free exercise rights of groups, associations, and cor-
porations. The Supreme Court has held that "[a]n individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those
ends were not also guaranteed.,245 One could argue that such freedoms
are only afforded to group efforts insofar as they promote protected indi-
vidual freedoms. Because the primary reason corporations engage in
"group effort" is to pursue profit, not to exercise religion, one could ar-
gue that they are not entitled to Free Exercise Clause protection. Howev-
er, while pursuing profit may be the primary aim of a corporation, it need
not be its only aim. This is especially true if the religious activity and the
pursuit of profit align. For example, if a kosher butcher's primary market
is a religious community,246 it is possible that adherence to kosher prac-
tices results both from sincere religious conviction and the desire to run a
prosperous business. The exercise of religious belief need only be sin-
cere, and the First Amendment will protect it whether it occurs individu-
ally or as part of a group.
The Tenth Circuit also observed that he Supreme Court has recog-
nized individuals' exercise of religion through their for-profit business-
es. 247 In Lee, the Court recognized that the requirement for an Amish
employer to pay Social Security taxes violated the employer's religious
belief, although the Court found that the requirement furthered a compel-
ling government interest.248 Similarly, Braunfeld addressed a free exer-
cise claim brought by Orthodox Jewish merchants challenging the state's
Sunday closing laws.2 49 The Court held that the law's indirect burden on
the merchants' religious exercise was not substantial enough to invali-
250date the laws °. Although both cases were ultimately decided in favor of
25the government, the cases were not decided based on the profit-
seeking aspect of the plaintiffs' activities and seem to imply that individ-
uals can exercise religion in the course of for-profit activity.2 2
245. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
246. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
247. Id. at 1134.
248. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982).
249. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-01 (1961).
250. Id. at 605-06.
251. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61; Braunfeld, 366 U.S at 609-10.
252. The Braunfeld Court never addressed whether the burdened religious exercise was that of
the merchants' businesses or the individual owners. In fact, it never identified whether the merchants
had incorporated. It is possible they operated as sole proprietors or in general partnerships. Either
way, the Court treated the burden on the businesses and the burden on the owners as one and the
same. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
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The Hobby Lobby court reasoned that if "individuals may incorpo-
rate for religious purposes and keep their Free Exercise rights, and unin-
corporated individuals may pursue profit while keeping their Free Exer-
cise rights," then for-profit activity and religious exercise cannot be con-
sidered mutually exclusive.253 To decide otherwise could lead to poten-
tially bizarre results. Adopting the majority's example of the kosher
butcher: a butcher operating a for-profit business as a sole proprietor, a
nonprofit promoting kosher butchering practices, or a synagogue selling
kosher meats could all receive free exercise and RFRA protection. How-
ever, an incorporated butcher who relies on the same kosher practices, or,
as an extreme example, a large corporation similar to Hebrew National,
would not receive protection for the same religious activity based on the
same religious beliefs simply because it is a corporation. The determina-
tion would turn on the identity of the believer rather than on the sincerity
of the belief or the burden on the religious exercise.
The majority was also troubled by the idea that if they followed the
government's reasoning that only nonprofit religious organizations are
entitled to free exercise protection, then Congress's definition of "non-
profit" would determine an entity's free exercise rights.254 For example,
the majority hypothesized that if the government decided to eliminate
"the for-profit/nonprofit distinction in tax law," then entities would arbi-
trarily gain or lose free exercise rights.255
The Free Exercise Clause protects religiously motivated conduct,
both of individuals and of corporations and organizations alike, from
impermissible government intrusion. 6 Allowing the government to de-
cide which individuals and entities are entitled to protection would un-
dermine the purpose of the right. This was the Court's reasoning in Bel-
lotti.257 Furthermore, the right to exercise religion should not be confined
to the church, the home, or the religious organization. In Lee and Braun-
feld, the Court addressed situations where individuals took their religious
beliefs to the workplace.258 Yet the cases were not decided based on the
relationship between the religious belief and business activity; they were
decided based on compelling government interests or the nature of the
burden. 9 As the Korte court reasoned, if the for-profit nature of the ac-
tivity precluded free exercise protection, the Court would have explicitly
253. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
254. Id. at 1135.
255. Id.
256. See BLUM ET AL., supra note 16, § 443.
257. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
258. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
601 (1961).
259. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59 (holding that mandatory enforcement of social security
system was a compelling governmental interest); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06 (holding that, be-
cause Sunday closing law did not make religious conduct unlawful, the indirect financial burden was
not substantial enough to merit free exercise protection).
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said so. 26° However, "[i]t did not.",261 For these reasons, as well as those
discussed above, for-profit corporations should not be per se excluded
from free exercise protection.
B. How For-Profit Corporations Exercise Religion: A Proposed Test
Although the Hobby Lobby court correctly held that for-profit cor-
porations can exercise religion and receive protection under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause, the court was not as clear as it should have
been in distinguishing between the religious exercise rights of the corpo-
ration and that of its owners. Both the Tenth Circuit and other circuit
courts deciding similar cases have confused the line between the reli-
gious beliefs and activities of the corporation and that of the corpora-
262tion's constituents. One of the fundamental principles of corporate law
is that a corporation is "a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obliga-
tions, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individu-
als who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.2 63 An individual or
group of individuals may choose to incorporate to gain the legal ad-
vantages of the corporate form such as limited liability and perpetual
264existence. However, the individual who incorporates also gives up
certain legal rights and takes on additional legal obligations.265 For ex-
ample, directors and officers of corporations take on fiduciary duties
such as the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.266 A shareholder relin-
quishes, among other rights, the right to "direct legal action to redress an
injury to him as primary stockholder in the business.267
Yet, while individuals may give up certain legal rights when they
choose to incorporate, those individuals, acting as the corporation's di-
rectors and officers, still retain a vast amount of control over the purpos-
268es of the corporations and how it will operate. Although it is a distinct
legal entity, a corporation can only act through its duly authorized
agents.269 The board of directors of a corporation sets the overall goals
260. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 680 (7th Cir. 2013).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134-35, 1137 (10th Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
263. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
264. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (listing limited liability as one of the advantages of the
corporate form), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (discussing how perpetual existence is one of the "most important"
objectives of a corporation).
265. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, I TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 7:3 (3d ed. 2013).
266. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 10:1, :11 (3d ed. 2013).
267. Kush v. Am. States Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9:5; see also Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265,
§ 8:2.
269. E.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 8:1.
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and objectives of the corporation.270 The officers implement those goals
and objectives and oversee the corporation's daily operations.27' Fur-
thermore, a corporation is governed by its articles of incorporations, by-
laws, and board resolutions, which define the powers and limitations of
its constituents and, in many cases, the corporation's purpose for exist-
ence.272 These documents allow the incorporators and the board of direc-
tors to determine the purpose of the corporation and dictate its overall
273operations. Furthermore, a corporation can be formed for almost any
274lawful purpose. A corporation can be formed as a tire manufacturer, a
grocery store, a school, a church, a restaurant, a homeless shelter, a hos-
pital, an arts and crafts store, or for hundreds of other purposes as long as
those purposes are lawful.
Because a corporation's duly authorized constituents act on the cor-
poration's behalf and play a significant role in determining the purpose
of the corporation,2 75 the constituents' views and goals can be reflected in
the organization and management of the corporation. The line between
the corporation and its constituents becomes even thinner in closely held
corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Mardel where the shareholders,
board of directors, and officers are essentially the same people.276 In
some situations, a single person may serve as the sole shareholder, direc-
277tor, and officer of a corporation.
A major obstacle to the validity of corporate religious exercise and
CSR as a whole is the theory of shareholder wealth maximization articu-
lated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,278 which asserts:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself .... 279
This theory limits directors and officers to making decisions based pri-
marily on the decision's impact on maximizing profits and shareholder
wealth. However, thirty-three states have a version of "constituency stat-
utes," which permit directors to consider interests other than the interests
270. E.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9:5.
271. E.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 8:2.
272. See id. §§ 4:1, :12.
273. Seeid. §4:1.
274. See id.
275. E.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9.5.
276. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
277. See, e.g., Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 2013) (identifying
Michael Potter as "the founder, chairperson, president, and sole shareholder of Eden Foods, Inc.").
278. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
279. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 684.
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of its shareholders when making decisions for the corporation.280 Direc-
tors can make those decisions so long as those interests are what they
reasonably believe are in the best interest of the company. 281 Although
"permissive constituency statutes only create the option (and not the re-
quirement) for directors to consider interests of constituencies other than
shareholders," they open the door for directors and officers to consider
interests such as societal interests, employee interests, and, for the pur-
poses of this comment, religious interests.282
The Tenth Circuit and other circuit courts have muddied the waters
by failing to adequately distinguish between the religious beliefs and
activity of the corporate entity and the beliefs and exercise of its constit-
uents. By doing so, the courts have sidestepped the foundational corpo-
rate law doctrine that a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its
constituents. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby frequently referred to
religious individuals taking advantage of the corporate form yet still re-
taining their religious beliefs.283 For example, the Hobby Lobby court
used the example of an individual kosher butcher who wishes to incorpo-
rate to take advantage of the limited liability of the corporate form.284
The court feared that, if the butcher incorporated, the individual butcher
would lose his free exercise protections simply because he incorpo-
rated.285 It did not address how Kosher Butcher, Inc. could exercise reli-
gion separately and distinctly from the individual.
If courts are going to recognize free exercise rights for corporations
and still comply with the fundamentals of corporate law, then it is imper-
ative to identify the corporation's religious beliefs and how it exercises
religion. It is not enough to impute an individual constituent's beliefs to
280. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2014);
FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-
221 (b) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2013); IND. CODE
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (2013); IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)
(2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 831 (2013); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASs'NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2013); MINN.
STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (2013); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-1(2) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F)
(West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2013); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (2013); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I IA, § 8.30(a) (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (2013); WIS. STAT. §
180.0827 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2013).
281. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26-27 (1992).
282. WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 10 (Jan. 18, 2013), available at
http:/Ibenefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit CorporationWhite Paper 1_18 2013.pdf.
283. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013),
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the corporation; the corporation itself must demonstrate religious exer-
cise to gain First Amendment and RFRA protection. There are a few
factors, grounded in basic corporate law, which can aid courts in deter-
mining the religious beliefs and actions of the corporate entity. In other
words, these factors help identify how a corporation exercises religion.
The first set of factors focuses on the organizational aspects of the corpo-
ration; the latter focuses on the operational aspects.286 These factors are
not exclusive, and they can be evaluated on a sliding scale.
The organizational factors include looking at the corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation or organization, bylaws, and board resolutions.
Documents such as articles of incorporation are already utilized in other
areas of the law to define the purpose of an organization for tax or regu-
latory reasons.287 Furthermore, they provide a relatively straightforward
mechanism for the incorporators to impute their religious beliefs to the
entity while still adhering to the formalities of corporate law. The articles
of incorporation, bylaws, or board resolutions could authorize or even
mandate that the directors and officers consider religion when making
decisions for the entity. For example, Hobby Lobby's purpose statement,
"[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles," directs the company's constituents to
operate according to religious principles.
2 88
Particular corporate forms also may be a factor in determining how
a corporation exercises religion.289 For example, nineteen states and the
District of Columbia have passed legislation creating a new class of cor-
porations called "benefit corporations.'" 290 Benefit corporations were cre-
ated to "address the unique needs of for-profit mission-driven business-
286. This test is meant to reflect the broad strokes of the organizational and operational test set
out in the Internal Revenue Code for 501(c)(3) organizations. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2014).
While the 501(c)(3) test focuses on private inurement and exclusive exempt purposes, this test fo-
cuses more on identifying the religious purpose of a for-profit organization that empowers it to
exercise religion.
287. See, e.g., id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2014); COX & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 4:1.
288. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122 (alteration in original).
289. Some courts have considered particular corporate forms in their analyses already, albeit
without much discussion on why the distinctions matter. See id. at 1136-37 ("The government
nonetheless raises the specter of future cases in which, for example, a large publicly traded corpora-
tion tries to assert religious rights .... But that is not an issue here. Hobby Lobby and Mardel are
not publicly traded corporations; they are closely held family businesses with an explicit Christian
mission as defined in their governing principles .... It is hard to compare them to a large, publicly
traded corporation, and the difference seems obvious."). Furthermore, in a concurring opinion to
Gilardi, Judge Randolph "emphasize[d] the importance of the Freshway Corporations' election to be
taxed" as an S-corporation. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1225
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He suggests that
because "[s]ubchapter S disregards the corporate form" for income tax purposes, allowing income to
pass through to shareholders, it makes sense to allow a similar pass through theory for RFRA pur-
poses. Id. Although his argument is relatively strained, consideration of a particular corporate form
certainly may be relevant in determining how a corporation exercises religion.
290. See State by State Legislative Status: Enacted Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER,
http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited May 5, 2014).
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es.' '291 They must have a "purpose to create a material positive impact on
society and the environment."292 Unlike constituency statutes, the direc-
tors of benefit corporations are required to consider non-financial inter-
293ests when making decisions for the corporation. A benefit corporation
whose mission has a religious component would be required to consider
religious interests in it decision-making,294 which makes determining the
corporation's religious exercise much more straightforward.
Courts should also consider operational factors in determining a
corporation's religious beliefs and exercise. These operational factors
include: the kinds of products or services the corporation provides, such
as products or services that promote a certain religion or have religious
aspects; the percentage of the corporation's funds allocated for religious
purposes, such as donations to a particular church or religious organiza-
tion or, as in Hobby Lobby and Mardel, funds the corporation spends on
its own religious activity; the branding and marketing of the corporation,
such as whether the corporation holds itself out as a religious or faith-
based business to the general public; and the corporate culture.
By examining these organizational and operational factors, the court
can more easily determine the sincerity of a corporation's religious be-
liefs. Although the Briscoe dissent expressed concern that allowing for-
profit corporations free exercise rights would "entangle the government
in the impermissible business of determining whether for-profit corpora-
tions are sufficiently 'religious' to be entitled to protection," using these
factors does not entangle the government any more than it is entangled
295for an individual person. Take, for example, an incorporated butcher
that suddenly adopts kosher butcher practices only to avoid complying
with FDA regulations requiring butchers to use more expensive, non-
kosher techniques. It would be no more difficult to determine the merits
of the butcher's free exercise claim than that of an individual who sud-
denly adopts a religion advocating pacifism only to avoid being drafted
in a war. As Judge Hartz pointed out, "[S]incerity questions with respect
to corporations should not be unmanageable. It should not be hard to
determine who has authority to speak or act for the corporation. And
sincerity can be measured by consistency of the present stated belief with
the history of the enterprise.296
291. CLARK ET AL., supra note 282, at 14.
292. Id. at 15.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
296. Id. at 1150 (Hartz, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
First Amendment rights stand as a bedrock of our civil liberties.
They prevent the government from imposing upon the thoughts, speech,
and actions of its citizens, which are often of central and vital signifi-
cance to their autonomy and well-being. They also preserve the cultural
richness of a diverse society by protecting minority views and beliefs
from being silenced and smothered by majority will. The First Amend-
ment protects both the purely personal liberties of the individual as well
as the societal interest in a diverse and varied citizenship. It serves both
personal and communal interests.
The Hobby Lobby decision preserved both of these personal and
communal interests by finding that corporations, even for-profit corpora-
tions, are entitled to First Amendment protection. It gave individuals the
opportunity to carry their religious beliefs with them into the marketplace
without having to sacrifice the protections of the corporate form. In the
particular case of Hobby Lobby, if the court had held otherwise, the fami-
ly that owns and operates the corporations would have faced the decision
to either compromise their religious beliefs or sacrifice the business,
which employs over 13,000 employees. This is exactly the kind of gov-
ernmental coercion that the Free Exercise Clause is meant to protect
against.297 In order to adhere to corporate law, it is important for the cor-
porations seeking free exercise protection to maintain the corporate for-
malities. Yet the sole fact that a corporation operates for a profit should
not exclude it from the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. The fac-
tors discussed above can help both courts and corporations seeking free
exercise protection identify corporate religious exercise within the
bounds of corporate law. Although the Hobby Lobby court should have
provided more guidance on how to distinguish the religious beliefs of the
corporation from its constituents, it ultimately reached the correct deci-
sion because it respected the spirit of the Free Exercise Clause and the
First Amendment.
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297. See id. at 1139-41 (majority opinion); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222-23 (1963).
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